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Rivero: Asylum and Oral Argument: The Judiciary in Immigration and the Se

NOTE
ASYLUM AND ORAL ARGUMENT: THE
JUDICIARY IN IMMIGRATION AND THE SECOND
CIRCUIT NON-ARGUMENT CALENDAR
However, in the steady beat of progress, which in some of its forms
greatly aids appellatecourts in the performance of their duties, it is of
some concern that certainprocedures and1values, developed over time,
not be sacrificedon the altarof efficiency.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Saidou Dia, a native of the Republic of Guinea, and Marwan
Youssef Albathani, a Lebanese national, have likely never met. Both
men were born in their native countries in the 1970s, both men were
politically active in their native countries, and the lives of both of these
men have sourced a major turning point in United States asylum law.
In 1998, Dia joined the Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinee
("Rally of the People of Guinea" or "RPG") a nationalist movement
opposed to the government in power at the time in his home country.' In
November 2000, a leader in his village approached him, seeking his
membership in the military to fight Liberian and Sierra Leonean
dissenters in Guinea. 3 Only three years earlier, this military killed Dia's
father. Fearing a fate in his father's footsteps, Dia refused to associate
himself with this military. Because the leaders of his village associated
the RPG with the foreign rebels, they viewed his refusal to join the
military as tantamount to a refusal to help his own government. Unsure
of how to remedy the conflict with the village leaders, Dia left his
1. Richard J. Cardamone, Foreword: How An Expanding Caseload Impacts Federal
Appellate Procedures,65 BROOK. L. REv. 281,281 (1999).
2. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane). A prominent goal of the RPG
at the time was the release from prison of Alpha Conde, the leader of the RPG, a parliament
member and a former presidential candidate. Id.
3. Id. at 246.
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village to seek the advice of an elder in another village. In his absence,
twenty-five members of the military questioned his wife, beat her, raped
her and set fire to his home.4 Fearing for his life, Dia left Guinea for the
United States. 5
Similarly, in 1999, Albathani fled Lebanon and sought entry into
the United States.6 A Maronite Christian, his life in Lebanon was
marked by over a decade of civil war-a political power struggle
between the Christian Lebanese Forces ("CLF") and the Shia Muslim
Hezbollah.7 As the CLF began to dissolve in 1995, the Hezbollah set out
to occupy the CLF territories.8 In 1996, while driving home, Albathani
was stopped by a Hezbollah gang, his car was stolen, and he was
blindfolded and beaten unconscious. Apprehensive of another beating,
he did not leave his house for two years. Finally, in 1998, he traveled
with his brother to his parents' home in Syria. Upon returning to
Lebanon, the Hezbollah again stopped him, and again his car was stolen
and he was beaten unconscious. 9 He regained consciousness two weeks
later-waking up in a hospital. Fearing further violence by the
Hezbollah, Albathani fled Lebanon. l0
The consequences of immigration proceedings are uniquely
significant. Removal proceedings are especially weighty because "[t]he
alien's stake in the proceeding is enormous (sometimes life or death in
the asylum context)."' 1 Because of the gravity of determinations made in
asylum proceedings, the system of adjudication must be one that is both
procedurally fair and substantively protective of the lives that are at
stake. To ensure fairness in the asylum scheme, the available system of
appellate review must be designed to correct the errors in the
proceedings below through a process that is meaningful. The
effectiveness of the current system's ability to insulate the rights of noncitizens is, as will be demonstrated, volatile at best.
This Note will assess the adequacy of the Non-Argument Calendar
instituted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
for petitions for review of denied asylum petitions. Part II will begin by
reviewing the current state of asylum law in the United States as shaped
by the significant statutory enactments and promulgated rules and
4. Id.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id. at 246-47.

Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 367 (1st Cir. 2003).
Id.at 368.
See id.
at 370.
Id.
Id.
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 140 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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regulations of the last decade. Part III of this Note will detail the initial
judicial acceptance of summary affirmance without opinion procedures
of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and Part IV will present the
subsequent judicial scrutiny thereof. Part V will then set out the
motivations and the mechanics of the Non-Argument Calendar of the
Second Circuit. Relevant to an analysis of the Non-Argument Calendar
will be a discussion of the unique roles of the United States Courts of
Appeals within the framework of the federal judiciary, the significance
of oral argument in appellate practice and the Second Circuit's historical
and traditional position as advocate of oral argument. Part VI will
continue by outlining the inadequacy of the Non-Argument Calendar
within these parameters. Part VII then suggests a more judicially active
role for the Second Circuit as both an exercise of its duties and a remedy
to the greater asylum scheme.

II.

A BEGINNING OF SORTS

On the heels of the one-year anniversary of the 1995 bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Congress
made fledgling efforts to fortify the power of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") 12 and effectively limited the scope of
judicial review of actions in the immigration agencies. Congress
significantly restructured the immigration terrain by enacting the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") 13 and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA"). 14 Prior to these enactments, Article III courts were
granted statutory jurisdiction to review the actions of the INS under
section 106 of the Immigration Nationality Act ("NA"). 5 While the
AEDPA amended section 106 subject matter jurisdiction, abrogating
judicial review of removal orders issued pursuant to a conviction for an
aggravated felony, it did not affect judicial review of denied asylum
applications. 16

12. The duties of the INS were given to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") on
March 1, 2003, pursuant to the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan. See 6
U.S.C. § 542 (2000).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
14. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
15. See 8 U.S.C.S. § I 105a(a) (1995) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996)).
16. See AEDPA § 440(a), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1276 (1996).
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Congress subsequently repealed section 106 jurisdiction entirely
through the IIRIRA.1 7 Asylum claims, by an express exception in the8
statute, were the sole exemption to this jurisdiction-stripping.
However, IIRIRA provided more stringent asylum eligibility
requirements, the bulk of which the courts lacked jurisdiction to review.
Under subsection (2)(A), an alien is ineligible for asylum if it is
determined that the alien "may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, to a country ...in which the alien's life or
freedom would not be threatened.. ,,19
Subsection (2)(B) requires that
an application for asylum be filed within one year of the aliens' arrival
in the United States. 20 An alien whose previous asylum application was
denied cannot qualify for refugee status.21 Prior to 2005, the federal
district courts received petitions for habeas corpus from immigration
proceedings, while the circuit courts received petitions for review. 22 In
2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which stripped the district
courts of their habeas power and established the court of appeals as the
sole court with jurisdiction to review claims originating in immigration
proceedings. 23
A.

The Asylum Process

Under INA section 208, the Attorney General may grant asylum to
an alien who qualifies as a refugee under INA section 101(a)(42). 4
Under the INA, a refugee is one:
[W]ho is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
25
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion ....

17. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000).
18. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
19. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
20. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
21. § 1158(a)(2)(C).
22. Disagreements regarding habeas jurisdiction in the wake of the 1996 legislations were
settled by the Supreme Court in INSv. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
23. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (to be codified at sections 8 and 49 of

U.S.C.).
24. 8 U.S.C. § I 158(b)(l) (2000).
25. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2000).
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An alien, if credible, can meet the burden of a well-founded fear of
persecution by testimony alone. 26 Credibility determinations are within
the ambit of an immigration judge's ("IJ") discretion. An alien can thus
present the IJ with either "[s]pecific, detailed, and credible testimony, or
a combination of detailed testimony and corroborative background
evidence.., necessary to prove a case for asylum., 27 In making an
adverse credibility finding, the IJ must provide "specific, cogent"
reasons for the 28finding and those reasons must "bear a legitimate nexus
to the finding.,

If an alien is dissatisfied with the disposition of his or her
application in the IJ proceeding, he or she may then seek review of an
adverse judgment with the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or
"Board").
B.

The Board of ImmigrationAppeals

The BIA is an agency under the direction of the Attorney General
that serves as the avenue of administrative exhaustion, acting as an
appellate body with a model similar to that of federal circuit courts. 29 In
1999, faced with a growing backlog of pending cases, the BIA
"instituted a mechanism for streamlining cases." 30 The process allows
cases formerly heard by three-member panels to be heard by a single
panel member and disposed of by summary affirmance without opinion
("AWO"). 3 Initiated as a pilot procedure in 1999, the AWO was
expanded to encompass the majority of BIA adjudications by final rule
in 2001.32 A single board member reviewing a denied asylum claim is
required to affirm without opinion if he or she:

26. See8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
27.
28.

Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2003).
Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990); accord Xia J.Lin v. Ashcroft,

385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (requiring, in the same language, the same rationale of the IJ);
Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring the same standard from the IJ).
29.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,136 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). The

reviewing bodies were panels consisting of three Board members. See id.
30. See 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). In 1992, the
BIA reported a 91.5 percent disposition rate (11,720 matters disposed, 12,823 matters received)
while in 1997 the BIA reported a 77.2 percent disposition rate (23,099 matters disposed, 29,913
matters received). See id.at 54,878. By 2001 the pending caseload in the BIA was at 57,597 cases.
Id.
31.
32.

64 Fed. Reg. at 56,136-137.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2005).
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[D]etermines that the result reached in the decision under review was
correct; that any errors in the decision under review were harmless or
non-material; and that
(A) The issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board
or federal court precedent and do not involve the application of
precedent to a novel factual situation; or
(B) The factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so substantial
that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion in the
case. 33
Upon the finding of an appeal as subject to AWO, the Board will

issue the following order: "The Board affirms, without opinion, the
result of the decision below.
The decision below is, therefore, the final
' 34
agency determination."

III.

UPHOLDING THE BIA PROCEDURES

The ensuing litigation challenged the validity of these streamlining
procedures on a myriad of grounds. Pertinent to the discourse of this
Note are the challenges to the AWO as violative of due process of the
law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Because the Second Circuit did not test the validity of the AWO until
2004-three years after the BIA final rule-the Second Circuit's
reasoning must be understood within the analytical framework set forth
in the similar corollary determinations of its sister circuits.
A.

The Second Circuit

Yu Sheng Zhang, a native of China, fled his home country in 1993
and sought asylum in the United States based on his fear of China's onechild birth control policy. 35 The IJ found Zhang's testimony incredible
and denied his application. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision through
the AWO. Zhang raised a due process challenge of the AWO in the
36
Second Circuit.
In reviewing Zhang's petition, the Second Circuit rejected the due
process arguments. 37 It adopted the First Circuit's analysis in Albathani
v. INS,38 with its preliminary observation "that an alien's right to an

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(A)-(B).
Id. § 1003.1 (e)(4)(ii) (citation omitted).
See Yu Sheng Zhang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 156 (2d Cir. 2004).
See id.
Id. at 156-57.
318 F.3d 365 (lst Cir. 2003).
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administrative appeal from an adverse asylum decision derives from
statute rather than from the Constitution., 39 The court then recognized
that the BIA may dictate the rules through which it will discharge its
duty and that the AWO was not unconstitutional, not contrary to the INA
and administratively sound.4 °
The court's focus then shifted to its own ability to administer
meaningful review. Significantly, the Second Circuit stated that its
conclusion that the AWO is valid was "supported by the fact that the
challenged procedures are followed by further appellate process, namely,
judicial review.... "41 The court cited the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney General,42 noting that the threat to meaningful
review is obviated by the existence of the IJ decision upon which the
courts can review the proceedings.43 The Second Circuit then observed
that the AWO survived the three-part test for due process under
Mathews v. Eldridge.44 In adjudicating a due process challenge a court
must consider:
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
[2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
[3] the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that
45 the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
The Second Circuit joined the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in their
determinations that the risk of erroneous deprivation was ameliorated "in
light of the hearing process that precedes [the BIA proceedings] and the
judicial review that follows." 46 Between 2001 and 2004, similar due
process challenges were brought in each of its sister circuits and each
respective petitioner was denied relief.47 The Second Circuit's holding

came at the heels of these decisions.
39. Zhang, 362 F.3d at 157 (citing Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
bane) and Albathani, 318 F.3d at 376).
40. See id at 157-58.
41. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
42. 327 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).
43. See Zhang, 362 F.3d at 158 (citing Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1289).
44. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
45. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
46. Zhang, 362 F.3d at 159 (citing Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717 (6th Cir. 2003) and Falcon
Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2003)).
47. See Hang Kannha Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2004); Loulou v. Ashcroft,
354 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2003); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane); Denko, 351
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The First Circuit: Returning to Albathani's Story

In 1999, the first federal due process challenge of the AWO came
before the First Circuit. After arriving in the United States, Marwan
Albathani, introduced in the opening of this Note, was placed into
immigration proceedings. The IJ denied Albathani's asylum application,
finding him incredible. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision through its
AWO procedure. 48 The foundations of Albathani's claim were that in
affirming without opinion, the BIA did not provide a reasoned basis
upon which the courts may review, and that the courts were deprived of
any process by which to "police the BIA to see that it is actually doing
its job according to the regulations it has promulgated. '" 49
The court rejected Albathani's first argument and held that the BIA
streamlining did not deprive the court of a basis upon which it could
conduct its review. 5 0 The First Circuit predicated its analysis on the
critical fact that "[a]n alien has no constitutional right to any
administrative appeal at all."'" The right to an administrative appeal is
contingent on the rules promulgated by the agency creating those
appellate procedures.5 2 That is, though the alien does not have a
constitutional right to an administrative appeal, he has a statutory right to
such appeal. Since "administrative agencies should be free to fashion
their own rules of procedure," the BIA had the authority to promulgate
the AWO. 3 The regulation itself states that the decision of the IJwould
be the basis for judicial review in the case of an AWO disposition. 4
Further, the court recognized that the AWO procedure is an affirmance
of result alone.55 The BIA may reject the reasoning of the IJ but still
56
affirm without providing the alternative basis for the determination.
Although the court agreed that the AWO scheme created problems, it
F.3d 717; Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d 845; Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2003);
Mendoza, 327 F.3d 1283; Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2003), Albathani v. INS, 318
F.3d 365 (lst Cir. 2003).
48. SeeAlbathani, 318 F.3d at 367.

49. Id. at 377. Albathani claimed that the AWO procedure violated the basic tenet of
administrative law that "administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to
rest." Id. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1946)).
50. SeeAlbathani, 318 F.3d at 379.

51.

Id. at 376 (citing Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996)).

52.

SeeAlbathani, 318 F.3d at 376.

53.

Id. at 377 (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978)).

54. See id. at 377 (holding that "Chenery does not require that this statement come from the
BIA rather than the J"); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).
55. See Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377.
56. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).
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concluded that these problems did "not render the scheme a violation of
due process or render judicial review impossible" or "violate any
statute."57
The court then rejected Albathani's argument that the AWO was
indicative of the BIA's failure to perform its essential review function.
Curiously, this section of the opinion begins by emphasizing the dire
consequences of asylum decisions.5 The opinion then recognizes a
statistic introduced by amici that "the Board member who denied
Albathani's appeal is recorded as having decided over 50 cases on
October 31, 2002, a rate of one every ten minutes over the course of a
nine-hour day." 59 The court then reasoned, based on its own experience
in reviewing Albathani's petition, that ten minutes was not a sufficient
time span within which the record could be reviewed. 60 Nevertheless, the
court remained reluctant to further inquire into the adequacy of the
AWO, assuring that any failure of the BIA to discharge its duties
resulted in only harmless error since the court itself could infer from the
record a reasonable basis for denial. 6 1 The court stated that it would take
on this line of questioning only upon the presentation of "evidence of a
systemic violation by the BIA of its regulations. 62
C. The Third Circuit:Dia's Story Continued
Having successfully departed Guinea, in 2001, Saidou Dia was
served with a notice to appear for illegal entry into the United States.63
The IJ found Dia's testimony incredible and denied relief. The BIA
affirmed the W's determination through the AWO procedure. Dia then
filed a petition for review in the Third Circuit, 64 arguing that the AWO
violated his right to due process in removal proceedings under the Fifth
Amendment.65 The court, construing Dia's argument as a facial
challenge of the BIA streamlining procedures, rejected Dia's position. 66

57. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377.
58. See id.at 378.
59. Id. (citing L. Getter & J.Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at A1).

60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. The court would then be inclined to consider "the INS's claim that the decision to
streamline an immigration appeal is not reviewable by the courts because these are matters
committed to agency discretion." Id.
63. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
64. Id. at 234.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.at238&n.6.
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Like the First Circuit, the Third Circuit began with the premise that
the Constitution does not guarantee non-citizens a right to due process
per se, but rather guarantees due process within the scope defined by
Congress.67 The court's primary concern rested in determining whether
the AWO procedure "fits with the notion that '[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"' in the spirit of
Mathews.68 Dia grounded his argument on the Third Circuit's decision in
Abdulai v. Ashcrofi, 69 adjudicated two years earlier, which enumerated
an alien's due process entitlements in the context of immigration
proceedings.70 The Abdulai court, adopting language of the Tenth
Circuit, set out three requirements for a procedure to hold muster under a
due process challenge. "An alien: (1) is entitled to 'factfinding based on
a record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to' him or
her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf;
and (3) has the right to 'an individualized determination of his [or her]
71
interests."'
Dia argued that the AWO denied him the requisite "individualized
determination" under Abdulai.72 The Third Circuit distinguished Dia's
case from Abdulai's, finding that in Abdulai the BIA actually issued an
opinion, the adequacy of which was the heart of Abdulai's argument.
The court pointed to the analytical difference between reviewing a brief,
unsupported opinion by the BIA and reviewing an AWO order adopting
the decision of the IJ. The Dia court ostensibly concluded that the
Abdulai requirements are reserved for "situation[s] in which the BIA
ha[s] chosen to speak., 73 The court did not address the application of the
Abdulai requirements when, through the AWO, it was required to review
IJ decisions as final agency determinations.
Dia next argued that the AWO deprived him of a right to
"meaningful review" under Mathews. The Third Circuit found this
argument unpersuasive since Mathews meaningfulness pertains to the
time of review and the manner of review by the judiciary, not the

67. See id. at 238-39 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) ("[T]he Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings."), and Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[D]ue process is 'flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."')).
68. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 239 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
69. 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
70. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 239.
71. Id. at 239 (quoting de laLlana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 240.
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meaningfulness of review by an administrative body as advocated by
Dia.74 The court continued, stating that "any recognized right to
meaningful review.., has been confined to the context of review by
federal courts, and not extended to review by an administrative appellate
body. 75
Dia further argued that the AWO violated the fairness requirement
of due process.76 While the Supreme Court has clearly dichotimized the
applied standards of fairness between a citizen and a non-citizen, with a
higher level of protection afforded to citizens, it has recognized some
minimum of constitutional fairness for non-citizens. 7 The Third Circuit,
in accord with the Seventh Circuit, agreed that the fairness requirement
is satisfied by a full and fair opportunity to be heard by the IJ,an
opportunity for review with the BIA and an opportunity for review by
the court of appeals. 78 The court concluded that a procedure less
desirable to the petitioner does not necessitate a finding that the
procedure is unfair.79
D. The Ninth Circuit
In the same vein, the Ninth Circuit upheld the AWO when the
petitions of Gerardo, Theresa and Christian Falcon Carriche came before
it in 2003.80 In the proceedings before the IJ, petitioners sought
discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal. The IJ denied
relief and petitioners appealed to the BIA. The BIA affirmed
without
81
Circuit.
Ninth
the
in
review
sought
petitioners
and
opinion
The Carriches argued that the AWO deprived them of due process
under the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit, adopting Albathani,
rejected the argument.8 2 It began by finding that a constitutional basis for
74. Id. at241-42.

75. Id.at 242 (internal quotations omitted).
76. See id at 243 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).
77.

See id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). To trace the development of

the contours of non-citizen due process in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see
generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Yamataya
v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
78. Dia, 353 F.3d at 243. The Seventh Circuit determined that "[t]he combination of a
reasoned decision by an administrative law judge plus review in a United States Court of Appeals
satisfies constitutional requirements." Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1996).
79. SeeDia, 353 F.3d at 243-44.
80. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2003).
81. See id
82. See id. at 850.
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an administrative appeal does not exist. Especially pertinent to the
court's reasoning was the "full hearing before the IJ, a detailed and
reasoned opinion from the IJ, the opportunity to present their arguments
to the BIA, and a decision from a member of the BIA.",83 The court
further reasoned that three-member review in the BIA is not the type of
procedural safeguard intended by the Fifth Amendment-review by a
single member satisfies due process so long as8 4that single member
conducted herself to provide the "required review."
The Carriches then argued that the AWO failed the Mathews due
process test. 85 In examining the erroneous deprivation prong, the court
stated that the existence of an additional level of review at the federal
circuit court level mitigates the possibility that an alien will be
erroneously deprived of his rights. The court also pointed to the third
prong of the Mathews test-the government's interest in the scheme.
The AWO was designed to clear the backlog of immigration matters in
the BIA. 86 This burden was not insubstantial and the scheme indeed
furthered this goal.87
The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have
all similarly adopted the Albathani analysis, rejecting due process
challenges to the AWO. 18 Part IV of this Note will argue that the
challenges are now ripe for reconsideration.

IV.

REEVALUATING THE

AWO

While each of the United States Courts of Appeals have upheld the
validity of the AWO, the judges have also expressed a deep-set concern
regarding the propriety of the AWO in light of the actions and behaviors
of the adjudicating members of the BIA and the inadequacy of IJ
proceedings. In evaluating the constitutionality and fairness of the
AWO, the courts have not accepted it with open arms as a model of
procedural integrity. In fact, the opinions concerning the AWO have
excoriated members of the BIA, criticized the AWO and pointed to the
aspects of the AWO that could evolve into the species of rightsimpairment for which the courts may grant relief. The Courts of Appeals

83.

Id.

84. Id.
85. Id.at851.
86. Id. at 852.
87.

Id. "In fact, the streamlining regulations have proven effective at reducing the BIA's

backlog and the cost of administrative appeals." Id. (citing 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002))
(emphasis added).
88. See supra note 47.
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have focused on two aspects of adjudication particularly: the
competence of administration and the bias of the administrative officials.
In a recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Richard Posner
highlighted the severe criticisms given by his colleagues, targeting the
competence of the BIA and the IJ. 89 In Ssali v. Gonzales,9" the petitioner
9
sought asylum to escape political persecution in his native Uganda. 1
The BIA decision erroneously identified Ssali's home as eastern
Uganda, when in fact Ssali was from southern Uganda. 92 The court
stated that "[t]his very significant mistake suggests that the Board was
not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner's] case and deprives
its ruling of a rational basis. ' 93 Another Seventh Circuit panel berated
the IJ's decision as "so inadequate as to raise questions of adjudicative
competence" and the conduct of the BIA was so aberrant that "[t]he
elementary principles of administrative law, the rules of logic, and
common sense seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other
cases." 94 Seventh Circuit opinions have further scolded that the 's
unexplained statements are "hard to take seriously," 95 that "[t]here is a
gaping hole in the reasoning of the board,, 96 and that "[t]he
procedure ... employed in this case is an affront to [petitioner]'s right to
be heard.,97 Moreover, Judge Posner presents an astonishing statistic:
In the year ending [September 23, 2005], different panels of this court
reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in whole or part in a
staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that
were resolved on the merits. The corresponding figure, for the 82 civil
cases during this
period in which the United States was the appellee,
98
was 18 percent.
These statistics underlie the court's conclusion that "the
adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below
the minimum standards of legal justice." 99

89. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005).
90. 424 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2005).
91. Id. at558.
92. Id. at 563. The regional distinction is especially important here because the Democratic
home of Uganda is in the south and the petitioner's membership in the Democratic party was the
political belief for which he claimed he was being persecuted. Id.
93. Id.
94. Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2005).
95. Grupee v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005).
96. Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2004).
97. Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005).
98. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
99. Id. at 830 (citing Niam, 354 F.3d at 654).
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The Seventh Circuit is not alone in administering sharp attacks on
the administrative bodies. The Third Circuit has joined the fray,
attacking both IJ behavior and IJ bias. In Wang v. Attorney General,10 0
the court found itself "sorely disappointed" that "[t]he tone, the tenor,
the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a
court television show than a federal court proceeding."' 0'1 The court's
disappointment was further reflected in its statement that "the IJ's
opinion in this case was highly improper for both its contemptuous tone
and its consideration of
personal issues irrelevant to the merits of
10 2
Wang's asylum claim.'9

The Third Circuit's disdain for IJ conduct again came to a head in
another 2005 decision. Prior to entering the United States, Lorraine
Fiadjoe, at age seven, was forced into Trokosi servitude by her father, a
Trokosi priest, in her native Ghana.10 3 She became the victim of ritual
04
servitude, forced labor, intense beatings, sexual abuse and rape.
Fiadjoe not only experienced abuse, but also the murder of her fianc6 by
her father. 10 5 The IJ proceedings were lead by an antagonistic IJ, the
disposition of whom marked the entire hearing. The Third Circuit
criticized the I's courtroom behavior-troublesome in light of the
sensitivity of the petitioner's experiences-as "hostile," "extraordinarily
abusive," "bullying" and "reduc[ing] Ms. Fiadjoe to an inability to
respond ....
,106 The IJ found Fiadjoe incredible and the BIA affirmed,
opting to not use AWO, in a short opinion. The BIA, having here chosen
to speak, ignored the behavior of the IJ in the immigration proceedings.
In yet another Third Circuit decision, Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 0 7 the
court attacks not the behavior of the IJ, but the reasoning. Reversing an
adverse credibility finding, the court rebukes the IJ's reasoning

100.
101.

423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 269.

102. Id.at 270.
103. Fiadjoe v. Att'y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2005).
104. Id. at 138. In Trokosi practice, when an individual commits a crime, a young girl from the
individual's family is offered to a priest in a fetish shrine as penance. This practice is the
manifestation of a belief that members of the wrongdoer's family will begin dying in large numbers
as punishment for the crime. To prevent these tragedies, the sacrifice of a young girl is made. The
life of the girl then becomes one of bondage, domestic violence and rape. The girl often becomes
psychologically dependent on the priest and is unable to leave the priest even after the period of
servitude has expired. The girls are outcast by society and at times are unable to return to their
families. With no skills or means of survival, the girls often spend their entire, short-lived lives as
sexual slaves to the fetish shrines. Id. at 139.
105.

See id at 140.

106. Id. at 154-55.
107. 396 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2005).
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saying, "it is the IJ's conclusion, not [petitioner]'s testimony, that strains
credulity" because the IJ "transformed an unsupported finding of
adverse credibility 10into
a positive finding that [petitioner] participated in
8
criminal activity."
The Second and Ninth Circuits have also fired the missiles of
criticism, highlighting the presence of bias in the immigration
courtroom. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit held that the IJ had detoured from
her role as a neutral factfinder and therefore violated the due process
rights of the alien.10 9 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit reversed an adverse
credibility determination, finding "the IJ's assessment of Petitioner's
credibility was skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and
conjecture; and his refusal to allow Petitioner to challenge those
views ... violated

Petitioner's

right

to

due

process." 1 10

Though

repeatedly remanding cases to the BIA for conclusions based purely on
speculation and conjecture, the Second Circuit still repeatedly receives IJ
decisions based on "speculation and conjecture," affirmed via AWO,
which require remand." 1
The courts' continual excoriation of the IJ and BIA is not a result of
geographically isolated anomalies. The patterns of reversal expose
problems far greater-approaching the systemic inadequacies that the
courts have cited as necessary for invalidating the AWO. The dockets of
the courts have become burdened by IJ decisions riddled with errors,
which the BIA should be outwardly correcting.
V.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT NON-ARGUMENT CALENDAR

In his keynote address at the New York Law School Symposium:
Seeking Review: Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction, Chief
Judge John Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit gave the following statistics regarding administrative appeals in
the circuit courts: In 2001, 5.7% of all federal appeals nationwide were
108. Id.at 292 (quotation omitted).
109. See Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the I's
adverse credibility finding because of, inter alia, the IJ's hostility toward petitioner and the IJ's
observable bias).
110. Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005).
111. See, e.g., Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding
the denial of a claim of persecution under China's birth control policy on the grounds that the I's
rejection of the authenticity of petitioner's birth control certificates was based "solely on speculation
and conjecture"); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding an adverse
credibility determination because "the IJrelied on a number of inappropriate standards with regard
to [petitioner]'s testimony and corroboration, and erroneously resorted to speculation and conjecture
when assessing the evidence in support of his claim...").
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of administrative matters. In the Second Circuit, 5.8% (262 matters) of
all appeals were administrative appeals. In the Ninth Circuit, 11% of all
appeals were administrative. By 2002, these numbers rose to 10%, 12%
(603 matters) and 25%, respectively. In 2003, 16% of all appeals were
administrative nationwide. In the Second and Ninth Circuits,
administrative appeals constituted 34% (2166 matters) and 33.9% of
their respective dockets. In 2004, these numbers reached an
unprecedented 19.5% nationwide, 39.2% (2747 matters) in the Second
Circuit and 39.6% in the Ninth Circuit. 1 2 To put these numbers into
perspective, the Second Circuit receives roughly 4800 cases a year and
13
calendars between 2800 and 3000 of these cases for disposition.'
By August 2005, the backlog of petitions for review of denied
asylum applications in the Second Circuit was "at just under 5,000
cases." 1 4 Motivated by the goals of managing this backlog and
preventing delays in the determination of the rights of aliens, the Second
Circuit implemented a Non-Argument Calendar ("NAC") system
through which asylum petitions would be reviewed." 5 The NAC was to
begin on October 3, 2005-the commencement of its October Term. 1 6
The Second Circuit promulgated new local rules through which it would
implement the NAC. 117
Local Rule § 0.29 Non-Argument Calendar
(a) Any appeal or petition for review in which a party seeks review of
a denial of a claim for asylum will be initially placed on the NonArgument Calendar. A case on the Non-Argument Calendar will be
disposed of by a three-judge panel without oral argument unless the
Court transfers it to the Regular Argument Calendar.
(b)... Any party to a proceeding on the Non-Argument Calendar may
request to have the proceeding transferred to the Regular Argument
Calendar. Such a request shall not be made by motion but must be
included in the party's brief, identified by a separate heading, and

112.

John M. Walker, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Cir., Keynote Address at

the New York Law School Justice Action Center Fall 2005 Symposium: Seeking Review:
Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction (Sept. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.nyls.edu/pages/3733.asp [hereinafter Walker, Keynote Address].
113.

Seeid.

114. Press Release from John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (Aug. 4, 2005) (on file with author).
115. See Press Release from John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (Sept. 13, 2005) (on file with author).
116.

117.
author).

Id.

Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Aug. 25, 2005) (on file with
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will be adjudicated in conformity with Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 34(a)(2) and Local Rule 34(d)(1)....
(c) The Civil Appeals Management Plan shall not apply mandatorily to
proceedings on the Non-Argument Calendar. However, any party to
a proceeding on the Non-Argument Calendar may request a
conference under the Civil Appeals Management Plan, which will
promptly be provided.... 118

Any requests for Civil Appeals Management Plan mediation
conferences or removal to the Regular Argument Calendar ("RAC")
must be made in the brief-not as a separate motion.' 19
A.

The Role of the Courts of Appeals

The burgeoning caseloads in the courts of appeals and the solutions,
both proposed and adopted, for management of these caseloads has been
a point of contention in the academy. 120 While both sides concede the
need for change in order to prevent the depletion of judicial resources,
differing conceptions regarding the function of the judiciary and the
correlative priorities dictated by these functions have cast the lens of
reform over the practice of oral argument. 12 The threshold issue in
evaluating the favorability of oral argument is defining122the contours of
the role of the circuit courts within the federal judiciary.
1. The Traditional Role of the Courts of Appeals
The courts of appeals occupy the space of two functional bodiesserving the function of a norm-enforcer and the function of a policymaker. 23 Some scholars have identified the same roles, labeling the
118. Id.
119. Walker, Keynote Address, supra note 112.
120. See generally Lawrence W. Pierce, Essay, Appellate Advocacy: Some Reflections From
the Bench, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 829 (1993) (outlining the historical development of appellate
advocacy, the problems facing the modem American appellate system and the division surrounding
the effects of decreased oral argument in the modem system).
121. See Cardamone, supra note 1,at 281-82 (citing William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End
Report on the FederalJudiciary,30 THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS,

Jan. 1998, at 1, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/cj96.htm).
122. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of the federal judiciary as a branch of the federal
government in its totality, see Jeffrey A. Segal, Courts, Executives, and Legislatures, in THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 373-89 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds.,
1991).
123. See Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in THE AMERICAN COURTS, supra
note 122, at 35. Songer finds a third function of the circuit courts, namely, that of hearing what
amounts to meritless appeals of "prisoners or others who have nothing to lose" as a means of
"legitimizing the [appellate] process and reinforcing beliefs in the fairness and justice of the legal
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functions as "error-correction" and "law-making."' 2 4 The errorcorrection or norm-enforcing role of the circuit courts is recognized as
the "traditional role," a duty of the courts since their inception in the
1890s.125 The circuit court's duty is to "ensure that an appropriate and
just outcome has been reached in each individual case brought before
them."' 126 The court operates from a backward-looking frame of
reference, that is, the court looks at the proceedings below to adjudicate
the adequacy of the administration of justice. 27 Thus, the role of errorcorrector exists irrespective of any externality except for the existence of
a proceeding below. However, the policy-making role of the court of
appeals pre-dates its traditional role and came 1into
being as a collateral
28
effect of the structural changes in the judiciary.
2. The Functional Role of the Courts of Appeals
At the time of their establishment, the obligations of the courts of
appeals more accurately reflected their conception as intermediary
12 9
courts.
The experience of the federal judiciary has been characterized
by an increase in the number of judgeships at the district court level, an
increase in the number administrative agencies, increased jurisdiction
over administrative courts and an overall increase in litigation.' 30 These
expansions have been met with relatively little increase in the number of
writs of certiorari granted by the Supreme Court.' 31 The effect of the
increases in both the size and the number of sources feeding the dockets
of the circuit courts, with little correlative expansion at the level of
review above the circuits, has been to render the nominally intermediate
courts as, functionally, courts of last resort. 132 Further, the Supreme
system." DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEALS 14 (2000).

124. Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
FederalCourts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 712 (2001).
125. Songer, supra note 123, at 35.
126. Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 712.
127. Id.
128. See Songer, supra note 123, at 35.
129. See id.
130. See id.; Cooper & Berman, supranote 124, at 716-18.
131. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 718.
132. See id; Songer, supra note 123, at 35 ("[T]he number of cases litigated in the federal
courts grows both quantitatively and in complexity while the number of cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court remains static ....
").
Songer also contends that another policy motivation underlies
the shift of the circuit courts from intermediary courts to courts of last resort:
Their traditional role of supervising federal regulatory agencies grows in importance as
federal regulation of the economy continues to become ever more pervasive and as cases
with major economic impact are no longer framed exclusively as constitutional issues
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Court's jurisdiction is wholly discretionary under the certiorari system
while the circuit courts retain discretionary jurisdiction only in appeals
from interlocutory orders-final judgments impose mandatory
jurisdiction on the courts of appeals. 133 It is this position, as a functional
which the second, policy-making duty of the
court of last resort, 1from
34
circuit courts stems.
While the error-correction function of the courts requires looking
backward, the policy-making function of the court requires a prospective
view.' 35 In execution of this function, the circuit court "looks forward
with a concern for effectively and justly governing the future behavior of
the actors and courts."' 13 6 Whereas the traditional function of the courts
of appeals exists independent of externalities, their law-making function
is entirely dependent on those attributes that render them functional
courts of last resort. If the right to appeal to the Supreme Court was, in
practice, "more than a paper right," and a large percentage of litigants
were granted certiorari in the Supreme Court, the function of the circuit
courts as policy-makers would be diluted.137 The circuit courts would
then more genuinely embody their ostensible position as intermediary
courts. In the way that the federal district courts are limited in their lawmaking capacity by the possibility of reversal in the courts of appeals,
would find corresponding limits on their lawthe courts of appeals
38
making function.'
Moreover, the development of the circuit courts into functional
courts of last resort has been accompanied by the development of a rigid
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in the circuit courts. This
custom is given teeth by the generally observed practice that the
determinations of a panel can only be overturned by a re-hearing en
banc. 139 This convention seems more aptly suited to a court of last resort
than an intermediate court. Compare this to the binding effect of a
but increasingly as issues of regulatory detail which are not at the center of the Supreme
Court's agenda.
Id. See SONGER ET AL., supra note 123, at 4-11, for a more robust discussion of the factors
contributing to this functional shift.
133. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (2000); Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 715-16.
134. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 718.
135. Id. at 712.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 717-18.
138. See C.K. Rowland, The FederalDistrict Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS, supra note
122, at 65.

139. See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Nicholas, 133 F.3d 133, 136 (1st Cir. 1998); Roundy v. Comm'r, 122 F.3d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1997);
Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 557 (2d Cir. 1987).
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district court decision. Generally, district court holdings are not binding
on any other federal judge. 140 The implications of this are twofold: first,
there are no courts inferior to the district courts, which the district courts
may bind, and second, district court determinations are not selfbinding. 141 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, binds all federal
courts and binds itself. 142 The court of appeals, with respect to these two
implications, binds the courts inferior to it, is also self-binding and
seems to take on characteristics more like the Supreme Court's. Again,
we see the circuit court as a functional court of last resort.
The functional role of the court did not develop at the peril of the
traditional role of the court. Both roles, in fact, have developed alongside
each other and "taken together, will sometimes pull an appellate court in
different directions ....
,,43 Each case coming before a judge requires
that judge to either yield to her role as error-corrector and give highpriority to the search for a remedy of the proceedings below or to
acquiesce to the inevitable future consequences of her decision and
shape the policy that will bind future litigants and, more obliquely,
herself. Whether one subscribes to the advantages of either choice, the
removal of oral argument from appellate proceedings limits the circuit
courts' ability to perform either function.
B. The Role of Oral Argument
Before the value of oral argument in the context of appellate
practice can be discussed, two ideas must first be presented. The first is a
control model-the ideal model of appellate procedure. Second, there
must be a measurement of adequacy for any deviation from this
standard. The ideal model of appellate procedure has been coined the
"Learned Hand Model" by Professors William Richman and William
Reynolds.'" Professors Jeffrey Cooper and Douglas Berman reduce this
model to at least seven essential steps. Judges must:
(1) review briefs submitted by the parties,
(2) hear oral argument,
(3) conference following oral argument,
(4) personally assess the case in a memorandum to be circulated before
or soon after argument and conference,
140.

See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n.10 (1996).

141.

See id

142. See Cooper & Berman, supranote 124, at 721-22.
143. Id. at 713. For an illustration, see id. at 713-15.
144. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the LearnedHand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273,278 (1996).
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(5) draft an opinion or opinions,
and
(6) circulate the draft(s) for comment and 1modification,
45
(7) finalize the opinion(s) for publication.
And while this model "may have reflected reality during the years
when Judge Learned Hand was a member of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit," the realities of46the caseload burgeon render this
model impractical, if not impossible. 1
Having outlined the ideal model, the next consideration is how to
measure the adequacy of diversions from this model. One tool of
measurement is the Constitution. The test questions whether the chosen
method of appellate reform offends a provision of the Constitution. The
second tools of measurement are the notions of fairness and justice. If
the constitutional test is satisfied, does the chosen method of reform
create too great a hazard to these ends in the name of efficiency?
1. The Argument Against Oral Argument
The school of thought criticizing the decline in the value of oral
argument rests its conclusion on two principles. The premier justification
for a departure from oral argument is that the process is overly timeconsuming. 147 Oral argument, even when reduced to only ten or fifteen
minutes per party, requires that judges and their staff travel to the court
and sit through the oral arguments. 48 These critics also contend that the
administrative details of arranging and calendaring oral argument are
wasteful of the courts' similarly scarce administrative resources. 49 Oral
argument also requires the full attention of the judges and their staff to
the cases being argued. The criticism is that the judges and staff are then
attend to any other matters during the course
left without opportunity to
150
day.
argument
oral
an
of
The second criticism of oral argument is that it contributes little, if
anything, to the judges' understanding of the case, acquired from the
brief alone.' 51 The brief plays the central role in the appeals process and
accordingly, the criticism of oral argument relies on the assumption that
complicated issues are better explained in an organized, well-thought-

145.

Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 690.

146. Id.
at 692.
147. See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1,20 (1986).
148. 1d. at 21.
149. Id at 21-22.
150. Id.
151. ld.at22.
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out writing.' 52 Further, oral argument begins to resemble an empty ritual,
what some may call "going through the motions," when the brief is
poorly written. To be more precise, a poorly written brief, a reflection of
counsel, will likely be poorly argued at oral argument. 53 Thus, the
critics contend that the "value of oral argument ... is largely illusory.' 54
2. The Argument For Oral Argument
Attacking the notion that oral argument has evolved into nothing
but an empty ritual, the proponents of oral argument contend that it is an
indispensable part of appellate procedure. 155 Although critical of the
value of oral argument, Professor Robert Martineau identified four
interests at stake in the debate over the value of oral argument. The first
interest is the institution of the judiciary itself. As the most politically
isolated branch of the government, the functions of the judiciary
"should, to the extent possible, be conducted in public, to assure the
public and the participants in the process that decisions are based on
publicly acknowledged considerations and interests."' 56 Oral argument
necessarily provides "some semblance of public visibility and
accountability" of the mechanics of circuit court proceedings.' 5 7
The second interest championed in the oral argument debate is that
of the judge. 58 In the appellate process, oral argument often represents
the sole occasion for one judge to interact with his colleagues on the
bench. 159 The relationship between the judges is often referred to as
collegiality. 60 Judge Cardamone's foremost concern in appellate reform
is the deterioration of collegiality. The significance of collegiality is that
it acts "as the lubricant that keeps the diverse parts of an appellate court
functioning smoothly."' 6' Without the required interaction with other
judges, with their differing views, opinions and politics, the appellate
judge becomes isolated from the inquiries of his colleagues, "whose
questions may reveal their thoughts about the case in ways that

152. Id. at 23.
153. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
154.

Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of OralArgument, 72 IOWA

L. REV. 35, 38 (1986).
155. See id. at 36; Richman & Reynolds, supranote 144, at 279-81. See also Stanley Mosk, In
Defense of Oral Argument, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 25 (1999).
156. Martineau, supra note 147, at 11 (footnote omitted).

157.

Bright, supranote 154, at 36.

158.
159.
160.

Martineau, supra note 147, at 13.
Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 701.
Cardamone, supra note 1, at 282-84.

161.

Id. at 283.
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conference alone could not."' 62 Justice Scalia has noted the importance
of the interaction of the judges in the decision making process:
You hear the questions of the others and see how their minds are
working, and that stimulates your own thinking. I use it, he added, to
give counsel his or her best shot at meeting my major difficulty with
that side of the case. "Here's what's preventing me from goin along
with you. If you can explain why that's wrong, you have me."
The collaboration of a panel in the courtroom, both physically and
164
mentally, impacts the quality of the decision rendered by that panel.
To wit, the "marked decrease in' argument,
therefore, necessarily reduces
65
the quality of decision making."'
Oral argument is also significant to judges because it "assist[s]
judges in understanding [the] issues, facts, and arguments of the
parties ....,,166 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed:

You could write hundreds of pages of briefs, and, you are still never
absolutely sure that the judge is focused on exactly what you want him
to focus on in that brief. Right there at the time of oral argument you
know that you do have an opportunity to engage or get into the judge's
mental process.167
Oral argument is the opportunity to clarify issues that are too
difficult to present in a brief or those ideas that can be better presented
orally. 168 Justice Brennan has also remarked on the value of oral
argument to the decision making process, intimating: "I have had too
many occasions when my judgment of a decision has turned on what
happened in oral argument, not to be terribly concerned for myself were
I to be denied oral argument."' 69 Judges attribute value to the ability to

162. Cooper & Berrman, supra note 124, at 701.
163. Joseph W. Hatchett & Robert J. Telfer, II, The Importance of Appellate OralArgument,
33 STETSON L. REV. 139, 142 (2003) (quoting Stephen M. Shapiro, Questions,Answers, and
PreparedRemarks, 15 LITIG. 33, 33 (1989) (citing This Honorable Court (WETA television

broadcast, 1988))).
164.

Richman & Reynolds, supranote 144, at 280.

165. Id
166. See Martineau, supra note 147, at 13.
167. Bright, supra note 154, at 36-37 (citing a transcription of a discussion given by the author
and Justice Rehnquist).
168. Martineau, supra note 147, at 13.
169. Comm'n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures:
Recommendation for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 254 (1975) (quoting Justice Brennan at the Third

Circuit Judicial Conference in 1972).
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ask questions during oral argument.' 70 Judge Myron Bright, of the
Illinois Supreme Court, contends that the most influential support of the
significance of oral argument comes from the testimonies of appellate
judges themselves.' 7 ' To empirically test the significance of oral
argument, Professor Thomas Marvell conducted a study of over 200
appellate judges in the United States. 172 Of the test samples, eighty
percent indicated they "strongly believe that
[oral] arguments are a
173
major help" in the decision-making process.
The notion of the judge's personal interaction with counsel
coincides with the final two interests recognized in the debate over oral
argument: litigants and counsel. Counsel, at oral argument, has the
opportunity to make a live contribution to the decision in the case, to
raise the issues they feel are most critical and to actively engage in the
appellate process.174 As Professors Richman and Reynolds contend, oral
argument "is most useful in those cases least likely to receive it, e.g.,
those in which the briefing is pro se, bad, or non-existent."' 75 Oral
argument gives the litigant an essential and important opportunity to
convey "the sense of urgency under which a party may be operating.' 7 6
The administration of justice should not be discharged in the abstract.
The consequences of litigation are personally experienced by the
litigants, and oral argument prevents the judges from the insular effect of
177
reading a brief in chambers without "face-to-face confrontations."'
The necessity of oral argument in appellate procedure cannot rest
alone on its inherent value. In practice, oral argument must have a
demonstrable affect on proceedings. Marvell's study indicated that
eighty percent of his sample found oral argument to have a significant
impact on judicial determinations. 78 Significantly, "cases not argued are
6
'affirmed at a greater
rate than cases in which argument occurs .... ,"'79
The critics of oral argument rest their assumptions on the fact that oral
170. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 76-77 (1978).

171. See Bright, supra note 154, at 39.
172. MARVELL, supra note 170, at 306 n.7. The study was based on a collection of statements
made by judges in scholarly works, colloquia, responses to questionnaires and interviews. Id. For
more on the methodology used, see id. at 5-14.
173. Id. at 75.
174. Martineau, supra note 147, at 17-20.
175. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 144, at 280.
176. Bright, supra note 154, at 37.
177. Id.
178. See MARVELL, supra note 170, at 306. n.7.
179. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 144, at 280-81 (citing Lauren K. Robel, Caseloadand
Judging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3,48).
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argument is not useful in every single appeal.180 This assumption is a bit
of a red herring. Oral argument remains valuable so long as it is "helpful
in a substantialnumber of appeals."'1 8'
VI.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NON-ARGUMENT

CALENDAR

The Second Circuit is traditionally held in high regard as the

greatest defender and benefactor of oral argument in the appellate
process.182 It is from this perspective that the NAC should be evaluated.
The removal of asylum petitions from the RAC to the NAC may meet
the constitutional test of due process, but it offends the notions of
fairness that govern the Second Circuit in both its appellate functions.
The NAC renders the Second Circuit in dereliction of its duties both as
error-corrector and policy-maker. Moreover, by removing oral argument
from a single class of cases, the Second Circuit not only fails the fairness

test but also toes the line of constitutionality.
A.

The Second Circuit'sError-CorrectionRole

The judiciary affords an agency deference in the entire spectrum of
agency actions. From rule promulgation to statute interpretation to
fashioning procedures, agency power can often evade judicial
intervention.18 3 The agency's authority, however, does have limits. The

180. See Bright, supra note 154, at 36.
181. Id.
182. See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL
REPORT 22 (1998). In fiscal year 1997, the Second Circuit reported that sixty-five percent of cases
were disposed of with the benefit of oral argument. Id. at 22 tbl.2-6. Of those cases in which the
parties were represented by counsel, eighty-five percent of cases were disposed of with oral
argument. Among the several circuits, these numbers represented the highest oral argument-todisposition ratios. The second-highest oral argument-to-disposition ratio overall was in the First
Circuit, totaling sixty-one percent. Id. The second-highest ratio among counseled cases was in the
Seventh Circuit, with seventy-eight percent of cases being heard at oral argument. Id. See also
Thomas E. Baker, IntramuralReforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped Themselves,
22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 916 (1995) (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 75 (1990)) (noting the Second Circuit as having the
lowest percentage of cases, less than twenty-five percent, decided without the benefit of oral
argument in 1990); Cooper & Berman, supra note 124, at 700 (observing that oral argument in the
Second Circuit "remains the norm rather than the exception") (footnote omitted); Pierce, supra note
120, at 832 (noting that as a matter of course, "[tihe Second Circuit allows oral argument in almost
every appeal").
183. See generally Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(holding that agency rulemaking power is limited by the scope of statute granting power); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that the court will
defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute when there is ambiguity in the statute and the
interpretation was promulgated within the scope of authority carved out by Congress); Skidmore
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initial due process challenges of the AWO procedures were rejected by
the several circuit courts. 184 The rationales of the courts in refusing to
invalidate the AWO seem to be the product of both a hesitance to
interfere in the BIA's execution of the INA and the legal terrain at the
time of those litigations. The REAL ID Act changed the relationship
dynamic between the DHS and the courts while simultaneously
rendering the topography of immigration law a more precarious
environment through which the courts must cautiously tread. It is in this
new legal environment and with this changed relationship that the NAC
becomes especially problematic.
The premier purpose of the NAC is to clear the backlog of pending
administrative appeals in the Second Circuit. 185 The judiciary, however,
is failing to look past the shortsighted goal of clearing its docket. The
NAC is a suture sewn to remedy a wound far more extensive than the
Second Circuit backlog. Though efficiency is the NAC's goal, it may
become the impetus for greater and more extensive litigation of petitions
for review. The NAC's strict filing rules attempt to remove motions
practice from the appellate scheme. Briefs must be submitted within
thirty days of filing a petition for review-a schedule from which
extensions will not be granted. 186 While upon first blush this rule seems
draconian, this rule is purely administrative. The rule does not deprive a
petitioner of any of the appellate steps he was afforded before the
implementation of the NAC. The strictness of the deadline is an
efficiency measure that does not sacrifice an element of the Learned
Hand Model. From the perspective of fairness, the closer to the Learned
Hand Model appellate practice is, the more fair it will be to the litigants
exercising their right to appeal. This rule does not affect the errorcorrecting or law-making function of the Second Circuit.
In hearing petitions for review, the several circuits have maximized
the utility of their error-correction function. In remanding case after case
to the BIA, the courts of appeals have identified the flaws in the
proceedings below and have demonstrated their commitment to
overseeing the fair administration of justice in the agencies.187 In
excoriating the BIA, the circuit courts have revealed and restated their

v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (holding that an agency interpretation is accorded judicial
deference when the interpretation is persuasive in light of the author's expertise, thoroughness,

consistency and legal reasoning).
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra Part 1II.
See supra Part ll.B.
Walker, Keynote Address, supra note 112.
Seesupra Part IV.
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frustration with the inadequacies of the proceedings below.' 88 The
continuous burgeoning of the Second Circuit docket with petitions for
review indicates that the error-correcting function of the court is not an
adequate device by which justice can be administrated.
The NAC will be deleterious to the Second Circuit's errorcorrecting function. Without oral argument, litigants will be deprived of
the face-to-face contact that keeps judges accountable. As stated, the
ramifications of immigration petitions are severe-even fatal. Facing
removal, the value of the litigant's ability to express this heightened
severity in oral argument is essential to meaningful review. To remove
oral argument from the proceedings of petitions for review is to decrease
the likelihood of detection of error in the proceedings below and
consequently decrease the Second Circuit's fulfillment of its traditional
function. Moreover, the NAC ignores the Second Circuit's functional
role as a court of last resort.
B. The Policy-MakingFunction of the Second Circuit
The REAL ID Act established the circuit courts as the sole arena of
direct review of immigration matters.189 At a time when there is a
significant change in the law, the courts should take on the burden of
more vigorously testing the adequacy of protections. The NAC is not
apposite to this goal. In light of the REAL ID Act, the alien's rights have
90
become more unclear because the precedents established after St. Cyr'
have become diluted. Issues of diluted precedent also rise in the vein of
Zhang and its validation of the AWO procedure. While the preliminary
observation that the alien has no right to an administrative appeal still
exists, the change in the appellate scheme changes the analysis of what
constitutes meaningful review. The Second Circuit should now look
prospectively and act to preserve the integrity of the appellate system for
the non-citizen seeking asylum.
In upholding the AWO, the First Circuit was guided by a reluctance
to identify defects in the AWO. At the time of Albathani, however, the
AWO was relatively new-with too little a sample size of dispositions
from which a pattern of impropriety could be construed. Five years later,
the same is no longer true. The continuous criticism of the BIA by the
federal courts upholding the AWO has grown stronger and more severe.

188.

See supraPart IV.

189. See supranotes 12-23 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 22.
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The deferential character of the courts during the first constitutional tests
of the AWO governed their rationales.
As a reform measure, the NAC addresses the efficiency problem it
faces, but at the peril of its functional role. By removing the essential
element of oral argument, the Second Circuit is either choosing to forgo
this responsibility solely in asylum petitions, offending the fairness test,
or has chosen the policy that non-citizens are second-class litigants,
offending the fairness test and perhaps the constitutional test. Since
obtaining oral argument "really amounts to a petitioning
process ... litigants who can afford expert advocates get the lion's share

of the scarce judicial resources available."' 9 1 Either choice is
undesirable, especially in light of an alternative that can preserve the oral
tradition that is so strongly championed by the Second Circuit and also
alleviate the burgeoning caseload dilemma at the source. To exercise its
law-making function, the Second Circuit should now re-evaluate the
AWO.
VII.

REVISITING MATHEWS V. ELDRiDGE

Although the Third Circuit rejected Dia's "meaningful review"
argument, it did state that there are still Constitutional requirements of
"meaningful time" and "meaningful manner."' 92 Furthermore, it
expressed a reservation of the meaningful review analysis to review in
federal courts-not administrative boards. 193 The Second Circuit
adopted this concern in Zhang.' 94 While the AWO concerned
administrative proceedings, the NAC effectively changes the face of the
federal proceedings the Second Circuit is so concerned with preserving.
Because of the changed topography of the immigration landscape, courts
should employ a higher level of scrutiny to challenges of AWO on due
process grounds. Now, half a decade in the wake of the final rule of the
AWO, the balancing of the Mathews factors has become more
troublesome.
A.

The PrivateInterest

The first Mathews inquiry concerns the private interest that will be
affected by the official action. 195 The interest of aliens seeking asylum in
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Richman & Reynolds, supra note 144, at 281.
Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane).
Id.
Yu Sheng Zhang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2004).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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the United States has remained the same-an interest in fleeing an
oppressive circumstance in one's native country. 196 The contours of this
interest are reflected in the social groupings that Congress provided-the
oppression for which gives rise to eligibility for asylum. The interest
represents a core of American democracy. Freedom of political
identification, freedom of social organization, freedom of or from
religion, freedom of ethnic or national identification and freedom from
1 97
racial discrimination are cornerstones of contemporary American life.
B. The Risk of ErroneousDeprivation
The second Mathews consideration is the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the private interest through the procedures used and the
value of additional or substitute safeguards. 98 Because a non-citizen has
only a single chance to be heard, and removal from the United States
will likely lead to an inability to return, "the 'costs' of an erroneous
denial are very high." 1 99 The finality of asylum dispositions, the life-ordeath circumstances surrounding asylum proceedings and the limitations
on an alien's avenues of relief must be considered in the risk analysis.
The costs of erroneous deprivation are very high and therefore the risk of
erroneous deprivation must be given substantial weight in the Mathews
analysis.
Remand of a single petition for review by an alien from a final
order of deportation is not a priori a cause for concern. 20 0 A pattern of
remands in a single judicial circuit or by a single judge would indicate
isolated abuses in the immigration system, traceable to a single source
and remediable at that source. The risk of erroneous deprivation is less
of a significant factor in these situations. Here, it is not the system-the
procedure-that threatens to deprive the alien of his interest, but actors
within that system that pose this threat. Because of the scale of
organization across the nation of the immigration system, a goal of
perfection, while exemplary as an ideal, is unattainable. Geographic

196. See Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of
Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 481, 487

(2005).
197.
198.

Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

199. Cruz, supra note 196, at 487.
200. In fact, lack of a single remand would actually seem to be an elevated cause for concern.
A history of unwavering affirmance would source the hypothesis that either the federal court level
of review was unnecessary or that the federal court was not adequately attending to its errorcorrecting duties.
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differences and political atmospheres are likely factors in the equation
and can underlie aberrations in the scheme.
This description, however, does not fit the state of the current
asylum scheme. IJ conduct and proceedings are erratic, unpredictable
and inconsistent. The circuit courts have time after time criticized the
actions of the IJ, and time after time they have remanded final orders of
removal. 20 And while at the individual level, the errors made by the IJ
are identified by the courts, the scheme itself is not being improved-not
approaching the elusive level of perfection-and it is in this situation
that the risk of deprivation is from the procedure itself. The risk
increases at the next level of review in the BIA because the disposition
"approaches" finality and the AWO, by decreasing the attention received
by each petition, renders that risk even more hazardous.
The second half of the deprivation analysis considers the value of
the addition of substitute safeguards. The circuit courts, in upholding the
AWO under the Mathews analysis, stressed the possibility that there may
be an erroneous deprivation of a right in the procedure being
questioned.20 2 The BIA, while an agent of the Attorney General and
accountable to him or her, has taken on the function of an appellate
body. As an appellate body, it should take on the traditional errorcorrection duties. The patterns of reversal in the circuits, however,
indicate that the BIA is not fulfilling this role.
C

The Government's Interest

The third prong of Mathews weighs the government's interest in
employing the established procedures.20 3 The stated purpose of the
AWO was the expedition of asylum petitions in the BIA.20 4 The statistics
in the circuit courts reveal a dramatic rise in the number of
administrative appeals beginning in 2001. This rise coincides with the
final rule promulgation of the AWO.
However, viewing these numbers from the entry-side, the number
of applications for asylum saw a dramatic reduction in 1996.

201.

See supraPart IV.

202.

See, e.g., supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.

203.
204.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
See supraPart I.B.
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Asylum Applications Filed with INS:
Venr

Nnmhr filpd

1992

103,964

1993

144,166

1994

146,468

1995

154,464

1996

128,190

1997

85,866

1998

54,952

1999

42,207

2000

48,054

2001

64,731205

This decrease in applications occurred after 1996, the year the
AEDPA and IIRIRA were enacted. These sets of numbers, taken
together, exclude the possibility of increased administrative appeals in
the circuit courts as attributable to an increase in the number of
administrative proceedings. °6
To the extent that it sought to clear the backlog in the BIA, the
goals of the AWO have been achieved. In upholding the AWO under
Mathews, the reduction of the backlog was the overriding consideration
of the courts in determining government interest. The goal may be better
explored in two phases. First, the BIA wanted to reduce the number of
appeals pending on its docket. Following this reduction, the BIA concern
would seem to lie in maintaining a manageable workload by the
prevention of future backlogs.
The statistics of the circuit courts and the INS evidence a successful

205. Dan Barnett, The Coming Conflict Over Asylum: Does America Need a New Asylum
Policy?, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 2002, at 1, 2 (citing U.S. Committee

for Refugees), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back102.pdf.
206. For an empirical analysis of the influx of immigrations matters in the federal courts, see
John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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reduction in the backlog. The first aspect of the AWO goal has been
achieved. Since the meeting of this goal, the AWO has remained in
place. However, the AWO is no longer the sole means of limiting the
backlog in the BIA. The 1996 enactments reduced the pool of qualified
applicants for asylum and effectively reduced the number of applicants
by almost fifty percent.2 °7 The statutory limitations on the number of
applicants reduces the number of IJ hearings and subsequently the
number of BIA appeals. 20 8 Combined with a mechanism that would lead
to greater satisfaction at the IJ proceedings, the 1996 amendments
provide a reasonable limiting device on the number of appeals reaching
the BIA. The government interest, in this respect, becomes a less
persuasive consideration in light of the increased risks of deprivation of
interests.
While the government's concern of a stymied administrative body
has been somewhat vitiated, the government has a growing concern in
the operations of the judiciary. A court system inundated with petitions
ostensibly manageable by the expertise of an administrative body
becomes less equipped to operate in those areas where the judiciary has
expertise. More docket time to petitions for review means less docket
time for civil and criminal appeals. This concern has manifested itself
into the decisions of the Second Circuit to promulgate the NAC. In the
alternative, the Second Circuit should have elected to take a more
judicially active role and re-examine its prior approval of the AWO.
While the efforts of the court to convey their messages to the BIA
are to be applauded, their effectiveness leaves much to be desired. Until
now, courts have chosen to react with a whisper. Remedial efforts such
as the NAC will prove to be just that-remedial efforts. The underlying
systemic problems in the appellate procedure cannot be corrected at the
safeguard level-the judiciary. The AWO, in the form that it has
evolved toward under an evasive judicial eye, must be limited, modified
or completely eliminated. With the continued existence of the AWO as a
flagrant middle man, the IJ proceedings can continue in their unchecked
and abusive form while the judiciary, increasingly limited by its own
resources and the acts of Congress, becomes less equipped to correct the
errors of those proceedings. The Second Circuit NAC prevents the court
from discharging both its error-correction and policy-making duties. The
eradication of oral argument from asylum proceedings deprives noncitizens of a fair right of review. The Second Circuit should revisit

207. See Barnett, supranote 205.
208. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
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Mathews and re-question the validity of the AWO as a means of most
effectively discharging its bifurcated roles.
Upon invalidating the AWO, the BIA may be induced to reform its
procedures. The decision may also raise Congressional awareness, which
would induce changes at the agency level. Sister Circuits may join the
Second Circuit in its new determinations. If the other circuits maintain
the validity of the AWO, the Supreme Court may become inclined to
grant certiorari to the properly situated litigant to resolve the circuit split.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Faced with an overwhelming backlog of asylum petitions, the BIA
instituted its AWO procedure-thereby reducing review by threemember panels authoring full opinions, to review by a single-member
panel affirming without opinion the proceedings of the immigration
courts. The first procedural due process challenges of the AWO were
rejected by the several circuits. Because non-citizens are afforded due
process by statute, not by the Constitution, the procedures need not reach
the limits of the Constitution. Moreover, a full and fair hearing
accompanied by a well-reasoned opinion by the IJ, coupled with the
opportunity to be heard in federal proceedings, satisfied the courts that
the AWO was not procedurally unfair.
In the wake of these initial decisions however, the law of asylum
has been transformed by a jurisdiction-stripping of the federal courts and
an increase in barriers to refugee status. Further, the courts of appeals
have continually excoriated the immigration agencies for their
performance in offense of the rights of non-citizens. From such
dissatisfaction at the BIA level, the federal courts have experienced a
surge in petitions for review of asylum petitions. The Second Circuit,
facing a similar backlog to the experience by the BIA, sought to
implement a similar plan with its Non-Argument Calendar.
In maximizing its error-correction role, the Second Circuit's actions
proved ineffective in correcting the greater errors of the BIA. However,
as functional court of law resort, it has a duty to look prospectively and
exercise its policy-making function. In lieu of the NAC, it should
consider re-evaluating the AWO under Mathews. The erroneous
deprivation prong of the Mathews test, in light of the government's now
decreased burden, should inform the reasoning of the court. The NAC
reduces the procedural safeguard of the federal judiciary in immigration
proceedings. With the consequences of asylum proceedings being
matters of life or death, the risk of erroneously depriving a non-citizen of
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the right to live free from persecution far outweighs a matter of
administrative efficiency that is no longer relevant.
Erick Rivero*
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